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CHRISTIANITY’S MIXED CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: TRADITIONAL TEACHINGS, MODERN DOUBTS†
John Witte, Jr.∗
Don S. Browning∗∗
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child1 (CRC) is a
landmark in the modern international protection of children’s rights. Adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, its fifty-four articles and two
Optional Protocols set out a lengthy catalogue of rights for children. The CRC
bans all discrimination against children, including on grounds of their birth
status.2 It provides children with rights to life;3 to a name, a social identity, and
the care and nurture of both parents;4 to education,5 health care,6 recreation,
rest, and play;7 to freedom of association,8 expression,9 thought, conscience,
and religion;10 and to freedom from neglect or negligent treatment, from
physical and sexual abuse, from cruel and inhumane treatment,11 and from

† This Article is reprinted in substantially similar form from Don S. Browning & John Witte, Jr.,
Christianity’s Mixed Contributions to Children’s Rights, 46 ZYGON 713 (2011), with permission from the
publisher.
∗ Director, Center for the Study of Law and Religion; Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law; Alonzo L.
McDonald Family Distinguished Professor, Emory University.
∗∗ Alexander Campbell Professor Emeritus of Ethics and the Social Sciences, University of Chicago;
Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University. Don Browning died on June 3,
2010, after a two-year battle with cancer. Before he died, we were hard at work on a volume, tentatively titled
From Private Contract to Public Covenant: What Christianity Offers to Modern Marriage Law. This Article is
drawn, in part, from this draft volume and builds on material that we worked on together. Though Don did not
see this final Article, it reflects ideas that we discussed at length.
1 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
2 Id. art. 2.
3 Id. art. 6, para. 1.
4 Id. arts. 7, 8.
5 Id. art. 28.
6 Id. art. 24.
7 Id. art. 31.
8 Id. art. 15.
9 Id. arts. 12–13.
10 Id. art. 14.
11 Id. arts. 19, 34.
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compulsory military service.12 The CRC adds special protections for children
who are refugeed, displaced, orphaned, kidnapped, enslaved,13 or addicted;14
for children involuntarily separated from their parents, families, and home
communities;15 for children with disabilities;16 and for children drawn into a
state’s legal system.17
The CRC is not the first modern international statement on children’s
rights, though it is the most comprehensive. It builds in part on provisions in
the 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child18 and the 1959
Declaration of the Rights of the Child.19 It incorporates and imputes directly to
children a number of the rights provisions already set out in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights20 (UDHR) and elaborated in the twin 1966
covenants on civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.21 And it
reflects and confirms a series of other international laws and treaties that
facilitate international adoption, immigration, and education, and that prohibit
child labor, pornography, prostitution, trafficking, soldiering, and more.22
While not legally binding or self-executing, the CRC highlights the
growing global awareness that children—the most voiceless, voteless, and
vulnerable human beings on earth—are deserving of “special care and
assistance.”23 In the course of the twentieth century, political and cultural
leaders around the world became increasingly dismayed by the savagery
visited on children first by the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression, and

12

Id. art. 38, paras. 2–3.
See id. art. 20.
14 Id. art. 33.
15 Id. art. 9.
16 Id. art. 23.
17 Id. art. 10.
18 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 1924, Sept. 26, 1924, League of Nations O.J. Spec.
Supp. 21, at 43.
19 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/4354, at 19 (Nov. 20, 1959).
20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948).
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
22 For a good summary, see David M. Smolin, Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 81, 85–89 (2006). For a detailed comparative study, see
CYNTHIA PRICE COHEN, JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (2005).
23 CRC, supra note 1, pmbl.
13
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the two world wars, then by waves of civil warfare, crushing poverty,
malnutrition, inadequate schools, untreated disease, and horrible cruelty and
crime.24 Many nations thus established firm new constitutional and statutory
safeguards to protect and support children—and instituted ambitious new
education, health-care, and social-welfare programs for children.25 In that
context, it was no surprise that almost every nation in the world had ratified the
CRC. Only two nations have held out: Somalia, which has no government, and
the United States, which has never brought the issue to a Senate ratification
vote.26
The American opposition to CRC ratification has long puzzled observers.
After all, American human rights lawyers and NGOs were among the principal
architects of this instrument and have been among the most forceful advocates
for children’s rights at home and abroad. Both Presidents Reagan and Bush and
their conservative Republican administrations were critical in marshalling
reluctant countries to sign on.27 But the United States to date has not done so.
When President Clinton pressed the Senate for ratification, he faced such angry
and widespread opposition that he eventually backed down. President Obama’s
tepid statements to date encouraging ratification have been rebuffed with
comparable vitriol.28
The principal source of opposition to CRC ratification comes from the socalled Religious Right in America—particularly politically conservative
Christians, mostly Evangelicals, but also some Catholics and Orthodox. There
are a few other groups, not associated with the Religious Right or political
right, who have joined in the opposition to the CRC. And there are a number of
conservative Christians and political conservatives who favor children’s

24 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kathryn A. Johnson, The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child: Empowering Parents to Protect Their Children’s Rights, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? THE
COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7, 7 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen
Worthington eds., 2009).
25 See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 103–05 (4th ed. 2010); THE NEW HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND
PRACTICE 327–419 (Bob Franklin ed., 2d ed. 2002).
26 Jonathan Todres et al., Overview, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN
ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 3, 3 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds.,
2006).
27 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Religious Right and the Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2006).
28 John Heilprin, Obama Administration Seeks to Join U.N. Rights of the Child Convention, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 22, 2009, 7:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/23/obama-administration-seek_n_
219511.html.
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rights.29 But it is largely the self-defined Religious Right—represented in
Congress by the Republican Party and now the Tea Party, and in think tanks
and lobbying groups, like the Family Research Council and the Heritage
Foundation—that has consistently and persistently blocked ratification.30
In this Article, we review and evaluate the main arguments against the
CRC that conservative American Christians in particular have marshaled.
While we take their objections seriously, we think that, on balance, the CRC is
worthy of ratification, especially if it is read in light of the pro-family ethic that
informs it and many earlier human rights instruments. More fundamentally, we
think that the CRC captures some of the very best traditional Western legal and
theological teachings on marriage, family, and children.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor David J. Bederman,
K.H. Gyr Professor of International Law at Emory University, a brilliant
advocate and scholar, and a consummate gentleman and family man. A pioneer
in the study of classical foundations of Western law, politics, and institutions,
and in the neglected importance of custom as a source and a sanction of public
law and private law, it was Professor Bederman who first encouraged us, a
decade ago, to critique the Christian Right’s opposition to children’s rights on
both historical and philosophical grounds. His insights on this topic, as on
many others, have proved prescient. This Article seeks to emulate both his
deep historical method of unearthing the intellectual and inspirational sources
of modern children’s rights and his keen forensic method of cutting apart
commonplace arguments against children’s rights that do not hold up on close
textual analysis. We dedicate this Article to his memory, with admiration,
affection, and appreciation.
I. EVALUATING AMERICAN CHRISTIANS’ COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CRC
No serious American Christian critic of the CRC that we have found
objects to its basic premise that every child has the “right to life,”31 “the right
from birth to a name,” and “the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.”32 No one objects to a child receiving food, shelter, bodily protection,
education, health care, or social welfare, or receiving protection from
exploitation or abuse. Few Christian critics defend traditional illegitimacy
29
30
31
32

For sources and analysis of this opposition, see Gunn, supra note 27.
Id.
CRC, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 1.
Id. art. 7, para. 1.
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laws—still maintained in parts of the Muslim world—that visit the sins of the
fathers and mothers upon their children who were born out of wedlock. Few
defend patriarchal family laws—still maintained in parts of the developing
world—that render children the exclusive property and prerogative of the
paterfamilias, and leave states with little recourse in the event of parental
neglect, abuse, or worse.
Three main arguments against the CRC recur most frequently among
American Christian critics. We distill these below and answer them briefly.
Most of these arguments, we conclude, are political arguments that are
sometimes dressed up a bit in Christian theology. Each of these arguments, we
further conclude, is hard to sustain on its own terms or in light of the teachings
of the Christian tradition.33
A. No Children’s Rights
Some critics of the CRC are opposed to the idea of children’s rights
altogether.34 The hard version of this argument says that rights are exclusively
reserved to adults and that children have no rights until they become adults.
Just as responsibilities to the state (like paying taxes or serving in the military)
or to other private parties (like making contracts or paying tort damages) do
not begin until a child becomes an adult, so rights against the state or any other
party cannot be claimed until children are emancipated. A child has public and
private rights only vicariously through his or her parents or guardians.
This argument fails to recognize that many of the CRC’s provisions are
simply confirmations of “natural” rights—rights rooted in human nature—that
do not depend on a child’s age, the agency of his or her parents, or the legal
formulations of the state. Basic rights to life and identity, nurture and care,
humanitarian aid, freedom from abuse, exploitation, cruelty, and the like are
natural rights that every human being can and must claim—even, if necessary,
against abusive parents. Moreover, a number of the CRC provisions confirm
the child’s natural rights to his or her parents and family—“that a child shall
not be separated from his or her parents,”35 that a child has a “right to
33 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005); BARBARA BENNETT
WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO
LIONEL TATE (2008).
34 For good summaries and analyses of these arguments against (international) children’s rights, see
WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
24; Gunn, supra note 27; Smolin, supra note 22.
35 CRC, supra note 1, art. 9, para. 1.
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maintain . . . personal relations and direct contacts with both parents,”36 and
that, in the event of separation, a child has the right to “family reunification”37
or to “adoption” into a new family.38 These natural rights claims of children
are the reciprocals of the natural duties of parents—or of the state standing in
loco parentis. The notion that a child has rights only vicariously through his or
her parents gets the relationship exactly backwards.
A softer version of this argument against children’s rights is that the CRC
does not take adequate account of different stages of child development and
the needs and interests that attach to each.39 Too many of the CRC rights, the
argument goes, are simply adult rights imputed indiscriminately onto a child
who has too little capacity to discharge them. It makes no sense to give a
toddler the same rights as a teenager, a first grader the same rights as a high
schooler. Yet, the CRC makes too little differentiation of the rights claims that
are commensurate with the child’s developmental stage.
This argument has a bit of force. The CRC does include some provisions
that take into account “the age and maturity of the child,”40 the “evolving
capacities of the child,”41 and stages in “the child’s physical, mental, spiritual,
moral and social development.”42 For example, the right to health care is
understood to be both “pre-natal” and “post-natal.”43 The right to education is
to be administered to ensure “[t]he development of the child’s personality,
talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.”44 The child’s
rights “to rest and leisure, [and] to engage in play and recreational activities”
must be protected in a way “appropriate to the age of the child.”45 But most of
the other rights listed in the CRC are stated in categorical terms. In some cases,
this is because the rights are absolute and perennial. Think of the CRC
provisions on the child’s right to life; rights to be free from neglect, abuse,
exploitation, and cruelty; and rights to humanitarian aid and poor relief in cases
of force majeure.46 These rights claims are always available to all children

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. art. 10, para. 2.
Id. art. 10, para. 1.
Id. art. 21.
Smolin, supra note 22, at 93.
CRC, supra note 1, art. 12, para.1.
Id. art. 14, para. 2.
Id. art. 27, para. 1.
Id. art. 24, para. 2.
Id. art. 29, para. 1; accord id. art. 28, para. 1 (recognizing a child’s right to education).
Id. art. 31, para. 1.
See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
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regardless of their age or capacity, and the CRC properly recognizes this. But
other CRC provisions on the child’s rights of expression,47 privacy,48 or
adoption,49 or right to maintain direct contact with both parents,50 would have
benefited from a caveat about the child’s age, capacity, and stage of
development.51 A number of countries that have ratified the CRC have
included such caveats among their “[r]eservations, [d]eclarations, and
[u]nderstandings”52 in ratifying the instrument. This is a relatively easy fix that
allows for acceptance of the CRC despite its imperfections.
B. No International Children’s Rights
Some critics of the CRC are opposed to the idea of international children’s
rights—rather than to children’s rights per se.53 Particularly in America, with
its federalist system of government, family law, including children’s rights, has
always been principally state law, not federal law, and has mostly been
statutory law, not constitutional law. These critics already oppose federal
statutes and federal court cases about children and families because they
encroach on the powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the fifty
individual states. For them, the involvement of an international body is an even
graver threat to local family jurisdiction. Some critics, not conversant with the
apparatus and application of international human rights in the United States,
portend apocalyptic scenarios of parents being summoned before a world court
for spanking or grounding their unruly children. Others, who know how
international human rights instruments operate in America, worry that
Congress will use CRC ratification as a ground for passing federal laws on
children’s rights that will preempt existing state family laws.
This argument for “American exceptionalism”54 from international human
rights norms is hard to sustain in our modern, transparent, political world. For
better or worse, human rights norms are now a major currency of international

47

CRC, supra note 1, art. 13.
Id. art. 16.
49 Id. art. 21.
50 Id. art. 10, para. 2.
51 For a discussion of child-development theories, see DON S. BROWNING, EQUALITY AND THE FAMILY: A
FUNDAMENTAL, PRACTICAL THEOLOGY OF CHILDREN, MOTHERS, AND FATHERS IN MODERN SOCIETIES (2007).
52 Smolin, supra note 22, at 90.
53 See Gunn, supra note 27; Smolin, supra note 22.
54 See ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 45–50
(2001); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, and
National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 831 (2001).
48
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relations. Not only were Americans among the principal architects of these
norms in the aftermath of World War II, but their political leaders now use
these norms to judge the performance and calibrate the country’s relations with
all other nation-states. It strains credibility for America to refuse to submit to
the same universal human rights norms to which it holds all others. And it
strains credulity for America to refuse to ratify this relatively mild children’s
rights convention—especially when it can stipulate reservations,
understandings, and declarations that would allow the CRC to sit comfortably
with existing American state laws.
A softer version of this argument criticizes the international social,
economic, and cultural rights that are guaranteed by the CRC.55 Modern
international human rights instruments protect both “freedom rights” (speech,
press, religion, and the like) and “welfare rights” (education, poor relief, health
care, and more).56 Some critics claim that freedom rights are the only real
human rights that states must respect. Welfare rights are mere aspirations that
states may choose to fulfill to the degree they can and in the way they prefer
(and not at the insistence of a needy claimant or a public interest litigant).
Animating this criticism is a half century of Cold War logic that juxtaposed the
“real” freedom rights of the West with the “false” welfare rights of the Soviet
bloc.
It is hard to sustain this logic now that the Cold War is over. The reality is
that both American law and international law have long recognized that
freedom rights and welfare rights are essentially interdependent. Freedom
rights are useful only if a party’s basic welfare rights to food, shelter, health
care, education, and security are adequately protected. The rights to worship,
speech, or association mean little to children clubbed in their cribs, starving in
the street, or dying from a treatable disease.57 President Roosevelt already
highlighted the interdependency of these rights in his famous “Four Freedoms”
speech—freedom of religion and speech, and freedom from fear and want—
that helped inaugurate the modern human rights revolution.58 Especially
children, who are born and remain fragile and dependent for many years, need
the special provisions and protections afforded by welfare rights. Both
55

See Smolin, supra note 22, at 105–06.
See Ingvill Thorson Plesner, Religion and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in RELIGION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 316 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012).
57 Id.
58 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President of the United States to Congress (Jan. 6,
1941), in 87 CONG. REC. 44 (1941).
56
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American and international agencies that cater to children have long operated
with this understanding. To insist, as some critics do, that all these protections
and provisions for children are not rights principally enforceable by courts but
“entitlements” principally served by legislatures is to engage in linguistic
hairsplitting with too little legal payoff.59
C. Endangering Parental and Religious Rights
The most vocal set of critics oppose the CRC because it endangers the
natural rights of parents to raise their children in accordance with their own
(religious) convictions.60 Most critics zero in on the CRC’s freedom rights of
the child: the right to “form[] his or her own views” and “the right to express
those views freely”;61 “the right to freedom of expression,” including the
“right . . . to seek, receive and impart information . . . of all kinds”;62 the
“right . . . to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”;63 the “rights . . . to
freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful assembly”;64 the right to
“his or her privacy, family . . . or correspondence” and freedom from
“unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation”;65 and the right to “mass
media” and “access to information and material . . . aimed at the promotion of
his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being.”66 While the provisions on the
child’s rights to form religious and other views are conditioned by “the
evolving capacities of the child,”67 the other freedom rights are stated
categorically. Critics worry that these freedom rights of children will restrict
the rights of parents to help shape the conscience, religion, and opinions of
their children; to guide them in establishing friends, relations, and associations;
and to monitor them in their use of privacy, media, and access to information.
What if a child wants to go his or her own way, resists parental limits and
instruction, and calls in these freedom rights against parents?
Other critics point to Article 29, which requires that a child’s education be
directed to “[t]he development of respect for human rights and fundamental
59 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Religion and Children’s Rights, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 56, at 299.
60 See Gunn, supra note 27, at 177–22; Smolin, supra note 22, at 90–107.
61 CRC, supra note 1, art. 12.
62 Id. art. 13, para. 1.
63 Id. art. 14, para. 1.
64 Id. art. 15, para. 1.
65 Id. art. 16, para. 1.
66 Id. art. 17.
67 Id. art. 14, para. 2.
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freedoms,” “[t]he development of respect for the natural environment,” and the
development of a “spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes,
and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and
persons of indigenous origin.”68 For some critics, no political body has power
to dictate such a transparently liberal educational agenda to any parents. What
if a parent or a religious school teaches that Christianity is superior to other
faiths; that husbands must have headship over their wives; that humans are
called to “subdue” the earth,69 rather than respect it; that certain cultural
traditions must be avoided, rather than befriended; or that human rights are
simply liberal “nonsense upon stilts,” in Jeremy Bentham’s pungent words?70
Does all that violate a child’s Article 29 rights, leaving a child or an interested
third party free to sue parents or religious schools?
Finally, critics point to Articles 19 and 37, which prohibit
“degrading
treatment,”
or
“depriv[ation]
“physical . . . violence,”71
72
of . . . liberty . . . arbitrarily” of children. These provisions further encourage
states to establish “social programmes to provide necessary support for the
child”73 and grant the child “the right to prompt access to
legal . . . assistance . . . before a court.”74 Critics worry that such provisions
might keep parents from spanking, grounding, and using other conventional
forms of parental discipline that they feel religiously compelled to administer
in application of the familiar Christian proverb that he who “spares the rod,
spoils the child.”75 Don’t these provisions inevitably create clashes between the
rights claims of children and parents, who normally cannot sue each other or
testify against each other at domestic law?76
Some of the freedom and education rights of children in Articles 12
through 17 and 29, abstractly stated, are too sweeping in our view and require
qualified ratification and prudential application. Many countries have entered
68

Id. art. 29, para. 1.
See Genesis 1:28 (King James) (“Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
upon the earth.”).
70 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 501 (John
Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).
71 CRC, supra note 1, art. 19, para. 1.
72 Id. art. 37.
73 Id. art. 19, para. 2.
74 Id. art. 37.
75 See Proverbs 13:24 (King James) (“He that spareth his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him
chasteneth him betimes.”).
76 See Symposium, What’s Wrong with Rights for Children?, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2006).
69
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reservations, understandings, and declarations to that effect.77 The protections
against physical mistreatment of the child in Articles 19 and 37 are directed
against serious violations inflicted by third parties; only severe corporal
discipline by parents or guardians that rises to what Article 19 calls “violence,
injury or abuse” could trigger remedies.78 It seems incongruous at best to insist
on a religious and parental right to beat one’s child so severely. Such action is
already viewed as a form of assault and battery in most modern legal systems,
and the CRC is simply reflecting those commonplaces. And in general it must
be said that every modern Western family law system involves prudential and
equitable balancing of competing interests of parents and children, which are
categorically stated in statutes and then harmonized in practice.
D. Pro-Family Human Rights
More fundamentally, it must be said that the CRC seeks to balance the
rights of children and parents and to preserve a strong pro-family ethic. The
CRC preamble states clearly that “the child . . . should grow up in a family
environment.”79 Article 3 orders that “States Parties undertake to ensure the
child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking
into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals [l]egally responsible for him or her.”80 Article 5 offers an even
stronger statement of parental rights: “States Parties shall respect the
responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members
of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom.”81
Article 7 assures the child’s “right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents,”82 and Article 8 assures “the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law
without unlawful interference.”83 Article 9 provides that “States Parties shall
ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their
will,” except, for example, where the parents prove guilty of chronic and

77 A detailed catalogue of reservations, understandings, and declarations of each nation that has ratified
the CRC is available on the United Nations’ website. See Status of Convention on the Rights of the Child,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited July 16, 2012).
78 See CRC, supra note 1, art. 19, para. 1.
79 Id. pmbl.
80 Id. art. 3, para. 2.
81 Id. art. 5.
82 Id. art. 7, para. 1.
83 Id. art. 8, para. 1.

WITTE&BROWNING GALLEYS4

1002

7/31/2012 11:09 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:991

persistent “abuse or neglect of the child.”84 And even in such cases, “States
Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a
regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.”85
These pro-family provisions in the CRC echo earlier international human
rights instruments that link children’s rights and parents’ rights, and focus on
the rights of the family more than on the rights of individual parties within the
family. Already the UDHR firmly established the priority of family rights and
responsibilities when it stated in Article 16, “The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the State.”86 This statement was repeated in several subsequent human rights
statements. Among them are the influential 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights87 and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,88 both
of which add that states must respect the rights of parents to provide their
children with religious and moral education according to their own
convictions. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights provides further, “The widest possible protection and
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while
it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children.”89 The
Covenant goes on to say that “[s]pecial protection should be accorded to
mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth.”90 Further, the
Covenant states:
Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination
for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young
persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation.
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or
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Id. art. 9, para. 1.
Id. art. 9, para. 3.
86 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 20, art. 16, para. 3.
87 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 18, para. 4.
88 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, art. 5, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981).
89 ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 10.
90 Id.
85
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dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development
91
should be punishable by law.

Underlying these statements is an important, but often neglected, Christian
integrative theory of marriage and the family that helped influence the original
drafters of the UDHR. Charles Malik, the highly influential Christian
philosopher and a member of the UDHR drafting committee, was the source of
this emphasis on the family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of
society.”92 Originally, he hoped to insert these additional sentences into the
UDHR: “The family deriving from marriage is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society. It is endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights
antecedent to all positive law and as such shall be protected by the State and
Society.”93 Malik believed that the words “natural” and “endowed by the
Creator” assured that the marriage-based family would be seen as endowed by
its own “inalienable rights” and not viewed as a human invention subject to the
caprice of either state or current public opinion.94 In this formulation, he
preserved several important ideas that were echoed in later international human
rights instruments, including the CRC—the priority of the rights of natural
parents, the importance of marriage-based parenthood, the prima facie rights of
children to be raised by their natural parents, and a larger narrative about
God’s good creation that sanctioned and stabilized these values.
Two of these values were lost in the final formulation of the UDHR. They
were the importance of marriage-based parenthood and reference to the
religious narrative historically used to support this institution. Those additional
provisions would have helped to blunt the criticisms by Christians and others
that modern human rights can cater to sexual libertinism. But Malik was able
to retain the emphasis on the “family as the natural and fundamental group unit
of society,” and this phrase influenced later statements about both parental
duties and children’s rights, including those in the CRC. The statement makes
it clear that the state must protect the family itself, as well as the respective
rights of children and parents. It also implies that the state did not create the
family and the rights of parents and children; the family has preexisting rights
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Id.; accord ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 18, para. 1.
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND
INTENT 254 (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., 1999).
93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 129–42 (2001) (providing
historical background on the drafting process of the UDHR).
94 MORSINK, supra note 92, at 255.
92
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resident in its very nature. That emphasis of the CRC and its predecessors
should help mollify Christian critics who regard the CRC as an assault on
traditional religious beliefs about sex, marriage, and family life.
II. THE ROOTS OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN (CHRISTIAN)
TRADITION
Not only are pro-family values reflected in the modern human rights
instruments—albeit not so fully as they might have been to satisfy modern
Christian critics—but these modern statements on the rights of the family are
rooted, in part, in deep classical and Christian sources of the West. Malik
reflected this tradition in proposing his language for the UDHR: “The family
deriving from marriage is the natural and fundamental group unit of society. It
is endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights antecedent to all positive law
and as such shall be protected by the State and Society.”95 This was not just a
statement about the rights of parents to control their children. It was also a
statement about the right of children to be born into a society that, in principle,
protected their right to be cared for and raised by their natural parents if
possible. Against the background of World War II, during which children were
separated from their parents by arbitrary state actions—or, even today, when
children are born through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization with no
knowledge of their donor parents96—this statement is all the more arresting.
A. Aristotle and the Priority of the Natural Family
The tradition that Malik was invoking found early authoritative expression
in the fourth-century BCE writings of Greek philosopher Aristotle, who
offered considerable insight into what evolutionary psychologists today call
“kin altruism.”97 This is our tendency to invest ourselves more fully in those
persons with whom we are biologically related. In his Politics, Aristotle wrote
that humans “have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of
themselves.”98 With that insight, he rejected Plato’s idea in The Republic that
civic health would be improved if competing nepotistic families were
undermined by removing children from their procreating parents and raising
95

Id. at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See ELIZABETH MARQUARDT ET AL., COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, MY DADDY’S NAME IS
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION (2010).
97 See BROWNING, supra note 51, at 347–73.
98 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. I, ch. 2, at 1128 (Richard McKeon ed.,
Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (c. 350 BCE).
96
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them in anonymity by state-appointed nurses.99 Plato hypothesized that if no
one knew who his or her children or parents were, then all preferential
treatment would end, and pure justice would emerge.100 This vision of the
relation of an omnipotent parental state, which was echoed in early Soviet
communism and in Nazi Aryan experiments, sends shivers through modernday American Christians, among many others. A few extreme critics argue—
wrongly—that the CRC is promoting this kind of arrangement with its
emphasis on the role of the state in protecting children.
Aristotle, however, believed that this kind of Platonic experiment would
fail. He believed that, in a state that separated natural parents and children,
love would become too “watery,” too diluted.101 The natural energy that fueled
parental care and sacrificial devotion to their children would be lost.
Furthermore, violence would grow because the inhibiting factor of
consanguinity would be removed. Aristotle believed that, from the perspective
of the developing child, the family is more fundamental than the state and prior
to the state in social development.102
These cardinal Aristotelian insights about the ontological priority of the
natural family came to prevail in the Western tradition. The later Roman Stoics
and Roman jurists called the marital household “the foundation of the
republic,” “the private font of public virtue.”103 The Church Fathers and
medieval Catholics called it “the domestic church,” “the seedbed of the city,”
“the force that welds society together.”104 Early modern Protestants called the
family a “little church,” a “little state,” a “little seminary,” the “first school” of
love and justice, charity and discipline for children.105 American common
lawyers called the marital household a natural if not a spiritual estate, a useful
if not an essential association, a pillar if not the foundation of a civilized
society.106 These ideas about the primal and essential place of the family in
society remain at the heart of modern theories of social pluralism, sphere

99 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. V, paras. 459–62, at 160–65 (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press 2006) (c.
380 BCE).
100 Id. Plato abandoned this view in his later Laws. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, bk. II, ch. 6, at 1154–
58.
101 ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, bk. II, chs. 3–4, at 1148–50.
102 Id. bk. I, chs. 1–3, at 1127–31.
103 JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 18–23 (2d ed. 2012).
104 Id. at 54–60, 66.
105 Id. at 134–36, 238–41, 256–66.
106 Id. 302–06.
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sovereignty, and subsidiarity, and they are reflected in part in the CRC and
other international human rights instruments.
B. Aquinas and Medieval Children’s Rights
Writing in the mid-thirteenth century, the Catholic philosopher Thomas
Aquinas extended Aristotle’s teaching that humans are family animals before
they are political animals and that humans have a natural inclination to produce
and bond with copies of themselves.107 Aquinas also built on the extensive
observations of his teacher, Albert the Great, about the different organization
and reproductive patterns of animals.108 Aquinas first observed that humans are
unique among other animals in producing utterly fragile and helpless infants
who depend on their parents’ support for a very long time:
[T]here are animals whose offspring are able to seek food
immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in
these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those
whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a
short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In
man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time,
there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even
109
the generic nature inclines.

“[A]mong some animals where the female is able to take care of the
upbringing of offspring, male and female do not remain together for any time
after the act of generation.”110 This is the case with horses, cattle, and other
herding animals, where newborns quickly become independent, sometimes
after a brief nursing period. “But in the case of animals of which the female is
not able to provide for the upbringing of offspring, the male and female do stay
together after the act of generation as long as is necessary for the upbringing
and instruction of the offspring.”111 In these latter cases, this inclination to stay
and help with the feeding, protection, and teaching of the offspring is naturally

107 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA supp., q. 41, art. 1, at 2699 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (c. 1265–1274); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, bk.
1, chs. 1–3, at 1127–31.
108 AQUINAS, supra note 107, at 2699; see also ALBERT THE GREAT, QUESTIONS CONCERNING
ARISTOTLE’S ON ANIMALS (Irven M. Resnick & Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. trans., Catholic Univ. of Am. Press
2008) (1260).
109 AQUINAS, supra note 107, at 2700.
110 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 122, para. 6, at 144 (Vernon J. Bourke
trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975) (c. 1264).
111 Id.
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implanted in the male.112 Think of birds, said Aquinas: they pair for the entire
mating season and cooperate in building their nests, in brooding their eggs, and
in feeding, protecting, and teaching their fledglings until they finally can take
flight.113
Human beings push this natural strategy of reproduction through pairbonding much further, Aquinas continued, not only because their children
remain dependent for so much longer but also because these children place
heavy and shifting demands on their parents as they slowly mature.114 This
requires the effort of both parents, assisted by their kin networks:
[T]he female in the human species is not at all able to take care of the
upbringing of offspring by herself, since the needs of human life
demand many things which cannot be provided by one person alone.
Therefore, it is appropriate to human nature that a man remain
together with a woman after the generative act, and not leave her
immediately to have such relations with another woman, as is the
115
practice with fornicators.

For this reason, human males and females are naturally inclined to remain
together for the sake of their dependent human infant.116
A man will remain with the mother and care for the child, however, only if
he is certain that he is the father, Aquinas continued.117 A woman will know
that a child is hers because she carries it to term for nine months and then
nurses the child thereafter. A man will know that a child is his only if he is sure
that his wife has been sexually faithful to him alone. Only with an exclusive,
monogamous relationship can a man be sure that, if his wife becomes
pregnant, he is the father. And only then will a man be likely to join his wife in
care for their child. “[M]an naturally desires to know his offspring,” Aquinas
wrote, “and this knowledge would be completely destroyed if there were
several males for one female. Therefore, that one female is for one male is a
consequence of natural instinct.”118

112

Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 144.
114 Id. at 144–45.
115 Id.
116 Id. ch. 124, at 150–52.
117 See id. para. 1, at 150–51; see also AQUINAS, supra note 107, at 2700.
118 AQUINAS, supra note 110, at 151; accord AQUINAS, supra note 107, at 2689 (“Now a child cannot be
brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless
there were a tie between the man and a definite woman, and it is in this that matrimony consists.”).
113
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Aquinas recognized that paternal certainty alone was often not enough to
bind a man to his wife and child because most men by nature crave sex as
much and as often as they crave food. But a rational man will be induced to
care for his child and bond with its mother because of his natural instinct for
self-preservation. Once a rational man is certain of his paternity, he will realize
that his child is literally an extension and continuation of himself, a part and
product of his own body and being (his genes, we would say today). He will
then care for the infant like it is his own body. And once he begins this parental
process, his attachment to that child will deepen, and he will be naturally
inclined to remain with the child and its mother. These insights about the
natural reproductive strategies of humans by enduring pair-bonding, which
Aquinas described in his own pre-scientific terms, are commonly echoed today
by various evolutionary biologists, biological anthropologists, and
primatologists.119
To these two arguments from the nature of human reproduction and
attachment, Aquinas added a theological argument that helped to stabilize and
solidify the relations and responsibilities of parents and children.120 Christians
teach that an infant is not just a bundle of craving appetites and insatiable
needs, or just a convenient, controllable conduit through which to pass the
family name, property, and business. An infant is also a child of God, made in
the image of God and embodying the goodness of God on earth. Christian
parents thus care for their infants not just because these children are
continuations of their own bodily substance and earthly achievements. They
also care for their children because God has given them the remarkable
privilege of being agents and exemplars of God’s creation and parentage of
children.121
The Bible underscores this, Aquinas pointed out. In the creation story, God
says, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.”122 But having created
the first man and the first woman, God then delegates to them and to all who
come after them the task of producing new humans: “Be fruitful, and multiply,

119 See, e.g., BERNARD CHAPAIS, PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN
SOCIETY 135–56 (2008); PETER B. GRAY & KERMYT G. ANDERSON, FATHERHOOD: EVOLUTION AND HUMAN
PATERNAL BEHAVIOR (2010); MELVIN KONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CHILDHOOD: RELATIONSHIPS, EMOTION,
MIND (2010).
120 AQUINAS, supra note 107, qq. 41–43, at 2699–706.
121 Id. q. 26, at 2643–45.
122 Genesis 1:26 (King James).
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and replenish the earth.”123 In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus describes
parental care for children as an image of God’s perfect care for humanity:
Or what man of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a
stone? Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a serpent? If you then,
who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how
much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to
those who ask him! So whatever you wish that men would do to you,
124
do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.

These and other biblical passages elevate and integrate Christian marriage
and parentage, Aquinas argued. For Christians, marriage is not just a natural
coupling for the sake of procreating children. It is also an enduring symbol, an
embodiment of the mysterious sacrificial union of Christ and the church.
Similarly, parentage is not just a natural inclination and duty, aimed to
perpetuate the human species. It is also a Christian privilege and responsibility
designed to participate in the creation of God, to exemplify God’s love for his
children, and to teach each generation of children anew the essence of the
Golden Rule125: “Do to others as you would have them do to you.”126
Much more could be said about Aquinas’s teachings on children, parenting,
and marriage, and those of many other medieval theologians and jurists who
added much to the discussion.127 What’s important to note here is that these
Christian ideas about the nature of parents and children provided the
foundation for a rich new law of children’s rights in the West. The natural and
religious rights and duties of a parent to a child, as Aquinas and other medieval
theologians and jurists had described them, became the template for a whole
series of affirmative rights that a child could claim at medieval canon law and
civil law. Included in medieval law were the child’s rights to life and the
means to sustain life; the rights to care, nurture, and education; the later rights
to contract marriage or to enter into a religious life; and the rights to support
and inheritance from his or her natural parents. Illegitimate children
furthermore had special rights to oblation or legitimation. Poor children had
special rights to relief and shelter. Abused children had special rights to
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Id. 1:28.
Matthew 7:9–7:12 (Revised Standard).
125 See AQUINAS, supra note 110, at 116.
126 Luke 6:31 (New International); accord Matthew 7:12.
127 See, e.g., DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND: RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN FAMILY DEBATE 113–24 (2d ed. 2000); STEPHEN J. POPE, HUMAN EVOLUTION AND CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 297–319 (2007).
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sanctuary and foster care. Abandoned or orphaned children had special rights
to adoption and to foundling houses and orphanages. All these rights and more
were real “children’s rights” in the later Middle Ages that both church and
state courts helped to enforce. Courts often added special procedural and
evidentiary rights to help them balance the oft-competing claims of parents and
children.128
Contrary to the assumptions of many modern Christian critics, children’s
rights were not an invention of modern liberalism, let alone of the 1989 U.N.
Children’s Rights Convention. Children’s rights were already staples of the
medieval Catholic world, which early modern Protestant and Catholic polities
alike absorbed easily into the new state family law systems born after the
Reformation.129 These medieval and early modern children’s rights were the
concrete complements to the rights and duties of parents as well as of the
church and state authorities who stood behind or, if needed, in place of the
parents (in loco parentis). To be sure, these early formulations were not a
complete statement of children’s rights judged by modern standards. Nor were
they free from religious conditions and restrictions that many would find
unacceptable today. But many of the core children’s rights set out in the CRC
and other modern instruments were already in place 750 years ago, animated
by overt Christian teachings.
C. Enlightenment Philosophy and Common Law Children’s Rights
Later Enlightenment liberals and common law jurists found these classical
and Christian teachings convincing—despite their rejection of much Christian
theology and despite the constitutional disestablishment of religion. The great
seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke, for example, described
marriage as “[t]he first [s]ociety” that had to be formed as humans proceeded
from the state of nature endowed with their natural rights.130 The marriage of a
man and woman, he said, was “necessary not only to unite their Care, and
128

For detailed sources and discussions, see CHARLES J. REID JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN
FAMILY: RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW (2004); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE
SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 49–134 (2009); and
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Rights of Children in Medieval Canon Law, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD 243
(Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2008).
129 See JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN
REFORMATION (2002); 1 JOHN WITTE, JR. & ROBERT M. KINGDON, SEX, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN JOHN
CALVIN’S GENEVA: COURTSHIP, ENGAGEMENT, AND MARRIAGE (2005).
130 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 319 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1690) (emphasis omitted).
THE
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Affection, but also necessary to their common Off-spring, who have a Right to
be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for
themselves.”131 For Locke, men and women had a natural right to enter into a
marital contract. But their children had a natural right to survival, support,
protection, and education. This imposed on their parents the natural duty to
remain in their marriage once contracted, at least until their children were
emancipated:
For the end of conjunction between Male and Female, being not
barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this
conjunction betwixt Male and Female ought to last, even after
Procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support
of the young Ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them,
till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. . . .
. . . [W]hereby the Father, who is bound to take care for those he
hath begot, is under an Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society
with the same Woman longer than other Creatures, whose Young
being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of Procreation
returns again, the Conjugal Bond dissolves of it self, and they are at
132
liberty . . . .

Similarly, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, for all
of his skepticism about traditional theology and morality, thought Aquinas and
the medieval jurists were exactly right in their description of the natural rights
and duties of parents and children: “The long and helpless infancy of man
requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their young; and that
combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed.”133
These natural conditions counsel not only for marriage but also against
“voluntary divorce,” said Hume, despite our natural rights of contract and
association.134 Hume agreed with Protestants that divorce was sometimes the
better of two evils—especially where one party was guilty of adultery, severe
cruelty to children, or malicious desertion of the family. But, outside of such
narrow circumstances, he said, nature has made that voluntary divorce without
serious cause will be “the doom inevitable to all mortals.”135 For with no-fault

131

Id.
Id. at 319–20.
133 DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 206–07 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1936) (1777).
134 DAVID HUME, Of Polygamy and Divorces, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 181, 188–90
(Eugene F. Miller ed., LibertyClassics rev. ed. 1987) (1777).
135 Id. at 188 (endnote omitted).
132
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divorce, the children suffer and become “miserable.”136 Shuffled from home to
home, consigned to the care of strangers and stepparents, “instead of the fond
attention and concern of a parent,”137 the inconveniences and encumbrances of
their lives just multiply as the divorces of their parents and stepparents
multiply. This is no way to protect the essential rights of children, Hume
concluded.138
William Blackstone, the leading common lawyer of the eighteenth century,
argued similarly:
[T]he establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this
natural obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that
ascertains and makes known the person who is bound to fulfil this
obligation: whereas, in promiscuous and illicit conjunctions, the
father is unknown; and the mother finds a thousand obstacles in her
way;—shame, remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigor of
139
laws;—that stifle her inclinations to perform this duty . . . .

“The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law,” Blackstone went on, “laid on them not only by nature
herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world.”140 And
again: “The main end and design of marriage therefore [is] to ascertain and fix
upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance,
and the education of the children should belong . . . .”141
Much like the medieval lawyers half a millennium before him, Blackstone
set out in detail the reciprocal rights and duties that the law imposes upon
parents and children. Nature has “implant[ed] in the breast” of all parents an
“insuperable degree of affection” for their child once they are certain the child
is theirs, Blackstone wrote.142 The common law confirms and channels this
natural affection and attachment by declaring that each child born to a couple
is the presumptive child of those parents; by requiring parents to maintain,
protect, and educate those children; and by protecting the parents’ rights to
discharge these parental duties against undue interference by state, church, or
private parties. These natural duties of parents are the correlatives of the
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
HUME, supra note 133, at 206–07; HUME, supra note 134, at 182–87.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *435.
Id.
Id. at *443.
Id. at *435.
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natural rights of their children, Blackstone further argued.143 Children have a
natural right to receive the support, education, and care of their parents, and
parents must respect their children’s rights. These duties continue even after
divorce (through child support) and even after the parents die (through
testamentary obligations and presumptions in favor of their children).144 These
early teachings of Blackstone on the necessary interdependence of the rights of
parents and children have long been axiomatic in the common law tradition on
both sides of the Atlantic. English parliamentary acts and American state
statutes from the eighteenth century to our day are filled with detailed
recitations of the duties of parents, the rights of children, and the collective
rights of the family.
CONCLUSION
Modern-day Christians would do well to view children’s rights as both a
natural and a spiritual good. They are a natural good in that they reflect and
respect the unique, natural reproductive strategies that humans have been given
or developed. The rights of children are in no small part the reciprocals of the
duties of their parents. The duties of the parents, in turn, cannot be discharged
unless and until they have the rights to discharge them. And these twin sets of
rights and duties are best discharged in a stable and enduring family structure,
which lies at the foundation of organized society and state. Those insights go
back at least to Aristotle and Aquinas, and the legal protections of children’s
rights that reflect these insights go back nearly eight centuries.
Children’s rights are also a spiritual good in that they reflect and respect
some of the Bible’s most cherished teachings. The Bible describes procreation
and parenthood as acts that are divinely significant and symbolic. Procreation
of children is in part an act of co-creation with God. Parenting of children is in
part an echo and expression of God’s special care for all humanity. The Bible
is teeming with passages that call us to love, nurture, protect, teach, and
cherish our children, and Jesus reserves a special place in hell for those who
would harm or mislead a child.145 Children’s rights, we believe, are simply a
mirror image of these teachings about the centrality of procreation, parentage,

143

Id.
Id. at *435–36.
145 See generally THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE (Marcia J. Bunge et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the role of
children in both the Old and New Testaments); THE CHILD IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT (Marcia J. Bunge ed.,
2001) (surveying Christian theological approaches to children).
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and protection of children. They translate into modern terms obligations that
are at the core of our identity and practice, as humans and as Christians.
Modern-day Christians would thus do well to join other religious traditions
in confirming and celebrating the greater protection and internationalization of
children’s rights today.146 After all, the Western (Christian) tradition did not
invent children’s rights or the attendant rights of parents and families. The
West simply discovered these rights as the natural corollaries and
consequences of the human reproductive process. It remains a fair question
whether the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is a proper
statement of children’s rights. And it remains fair to question how, why, when,
by whom, and against whom children’s rights are vindicated in local legal
systems. The CRC does overreach in some of its children’s rights statements,
and it does not always take sufficient account of a child’s age, capacity, and
stage of development. The CRC also could have done more to emphasize the
priority of the natural family, though this value is celebrated in the CRC and
other international human rights instruments. But, on balance and with
qualifications, we think the CRC is an eminently valuable contribution to the
protection of all children—the most voiceless, voteless, and vulnerable
amongst us.

146 For discussions of the confirmation of children’s rights by other world religions, see CHILDREN AND
CHILDHOOD IN WORLD RELIGIONS: PRIMARY SOURCES AND TEXTS (Don S. Browning & Marcia J. Bunge eds.,
2009); and SEX, MARRIAGE, & FAMILY IN WORLD RELIGIONS (Don S. Browning et al. eds., 2006).

